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Abstract
The vulnerability of neural networks under adversarial
attacks has raised serious concerns and motivated extensive
research. It has been shown that both neural networks and
adversarial attacks against them can be sensitive to input
transformations such as linear translation and rotation, and
that human vision, which is robust against adversarial at-
tacks, is invariant to natural input transformations. Based
on these, this paper tests the hypothesis that model robust-
ness can be further improved when it is adversarially trained
against transformed attacks and transformation-invariant
attacks. Experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and restricted
ImageNet show that while transformations of attacks alone
do not affect robustness, transformation-invariant attacks
can improve model robustness by 2.5% on MNIST, 3.7% on
CIFAR-10, and 1.1% on restricted ImageNet. We discuss the
intuition behind this phenomenon.
1. Introduction
While deep neural networks achieved near-human per-
formance on various machine perception tasks, it is found
that these models can be very sensitive to small but care-
fully designed input perturbations [23, 9, 1], thus allowing
the attackers to fool a machine in targeted ways by reverse
engineering the inputs. Recent studies have demonstrated
potential risks in applying neural networks for classifica-
tion [19, 18, 14, 8], detection and segmentation [11, 27],
image retrieval [21], and reinforcement learning [12, 13].
Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated that these attacks
are successful under real-world settings [15, 20, 3, 7], posing
much threat to safety-critical applications.
Existing work has revealed that adversarial attacks in the
form of small input perturbations can be ineffective under
natural input transformations, and therefore random transfor-
mations can be used to pre-process the inputs and improve
model robustness [10]. It was later shown, however, that
such pre-processing essentially creates a gradient obfusca-
tion effect and can be broken by transformation-invariant
(robust) attacks [2, 6]. The feasibility of transformation-
invariant attacks in real-world applications has also been
demonstrated [3]. Several successful defense have been
proposed that do not rely on gradient obfuscation. Notable
ones include adversarial training [24, 17] and TRADES [28].
The former directly performs model training through adver-
sarial instead of benign examples; the latter uses adversarial
examples to push the decision boundary away from the data
distribution. However, to our best knowledge, no existing
approaches explicitly tackle transformation-invariant attacks.
Figure 1. Schematic of the proposed learning architecture.
This workshop paper is thus motivated to investigate the
following hypothesis: Model robustness can be enhanced
through training against transformation-invariant attacks.
Specifically, we position our investigation in the context of
image classification, and use a classifier that passes an en-
semble of input transformations through shared copies of a
convolutional neural network, and aggregates network out-
puts for decision making (Fig. 1). As a preliminary study
and for implementation feasibility, we consider linear trans-
formations including input cropping, rotation, and zooming.
We assume that under appropriate parameter settings, these
transformations are content preserving, i.e., the transformed
images keep salient features, and can still be correctly clas-
sified by human beings. We apply adversarial training to
the proposed model, and simulate transformation-invariant
adversaries during the attack phases of the training. A com-
parison between the proposed method and the standard ad-
versarial training is illustrated in Fig. 2.
We conducted exhaustive experiments on MNIST,
CIFAR-10, and restricted ImageNet, and compaired robust-
ness performance with Madry’s et al [17]. Empirical results
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Figure 2. Comparison between different training methods: (a)
Vanilla, (b) transformation-invariant: constraining the classifier
with transformations of inputs, by assuming that transformations
preserve labels, (c) adversarial training and TRADES: constrain-
ing the classifier with -balls around data points, by assuming that
labels are preserved within these balls; (d) proposed: constraining
the classifier with both transformations and the transformed -balls.
show that while transformations of attacks alone do not af-
fect robustness, transformation-invariant attacks can improve
model robustness by 2.5% on MNIST, 3.7% on CIFAR-10,
and 1.1% on restricted ImageNet. While a rigorous compari-
son with TRADES is yet to be performed (to make sure all
parametric settings are equal), our current result is on par
with those reported in [28], although our method is origi-
nated from a different perspective. In addition, we perform
model inspection to show that our method does not introduce
gradient obfuscation.
While a full analysis is deferred to a full paper, here we
provide insights on the connection between this work, which
is a direct extension of adversarial training, and TRADES
(Fig. 2(c-d)). In a binary classification setting, both adver-
sarial training and TRADES seek decision boundaries that
avoid cutting through neighborhoods of data points as a re-
sult of minimizing the robust error. Since 0-1 loss leads to
NP-hard optimization, both utilize surrogate losses for com-
putational feasibility. Between the two, TRADES optimizes
a tighter bound of the robust error. However, it should be
noted that the definition of robust error relies on the defini-
tion of label-preserving operators on the input distribution
(e.g., the -ball). In this work, we essentially impose a more
restrictive definition of the robust error by utilizing the fact
that salient image features should not be affected by linear
transformations [26]. We hypothesize that this constraint
can be used in parallel to TRADES, although testing of this
hypothesis will be left for future work.
2. Proposed Method
2.1. Preliminaries
Given (x, y) ∈ D as an image-label pair from dataset
D, a classifier f(·, θ) : Rd → [0, 1]k with parameters
θ that maps images to softmax outputs, and a loss func-
tion L(·, ·) : [0, 1]k × [0, 1]k → R, an untargeted at-
tack can be formulated as the problem of finding xadv =
argmaxx∈N(x) L(y, f(x, θ)), where N(x) is a lp ball
around x with radius . Attacks with p =∞ [23, 15, 16, 17],
p = 2 [4, 18], p = 1 [5], and p = 0 [22] have been proposed.
In this paper we focus on l∞ attack, which is the most widely
studied case. Common l∞ attacks include Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM), Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [23], and
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [17].
Among all defense mechanisms, adversarial training re-
mains as one of the few that do not suffer from gradient
obfuscation [2]. It can be formulated as a min-max problem:
min
θ
E
x,y∼D
[
max
x′∈N(x)
L(y, f(x′, θ))
]
(1)
While it is hard to solve Eq. (1) directly due to the noncon-
cavity of the inner (attack) problem and the limited capacity
of f , a common practice is to iteratively find adversaries and
train the network on these adversaries [15, 17].
2.2. Transformation-Invariant adversarial training
The proposed network architecture passes an ensemble of
transformations of an input through copies of a shared net-
work, before aggregating the network outputs. Let the shared
network be f(·, θ), and the set of input transformations be
T . The final prediction of an input x follows:
ypred =
1
|T |
∑
T∈T
f(T (x), θ). (2)
And the aggregated loss is defined as:
J(x, y; θ) =
∑
T∈T
L(y, f(T (x), θ)) (3)
For classification tasks L(·, ·) is the cross-entropy, and stan-
dard training is done by solving minθ Ex,y∼D [J(x, y; θ)].
Similar to [17], we perform adversarial training through:
min
θ
E
x,y∼D
[
max
x′∈N(x)
J(x′, y; θ)
]
(4)
It is worth noting that the inner problem in Eq. (4) is an at-
tack robust against all transformations, and is similar to the
Expectation of Transformation (EoT) method [2, 3]. How-
ever, to our best knowledge, EoT type of attacks have not yet
been incorporated into adversarial training. We use PGD at-
tacks [17] to approximate the inner maximization of Eq. (4).
The parameters for PGD attack are summarized in Tab. 1.
Table 1. Hyper-parameters used for adversarial training. : pertur-
bation bound; a: step size; t: number of steps
Dataset  a t
MNIST 0.3 0.01 40
CIFAR-10 8/255 2/255 7
Our networks for MNIST and CIFAR-10 follow the wider
networks in [17]. We select different cropping operations as
the transformation set T for the two datasets: If not other-
wise specified, we use 9 crops each with size 20 for MNIST
and 8 crops with size 28 for CIFAR-10 with configurations
shown in Fig.3. We use B or P to denote the baseline
network (Madry et al. [17]) and the proposed network, re-
spectively, and subscripts s and r to denote standard and
adversarial training, respectively. Specifically, Pr repre-
sents the proposed model with adversarial training using
transformation-invariant attacks.
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Figure 3. Locations of crops for tested cropping sizes. Black dots
denote the center of the crops.
3. Results and Discussions
We evaluate the empirical robustness of the proposed
method against various existing attacks with different set-
tings, and perform a thorough investigation on whether our
method relies on gradient obfuscation. We also highlight that
training the model with separated attacks for individual input
transformations is not effective. Lastly, we show our method
is more data efficient than standard adversarial training.
3.1. Evaluation of Empirical Robustness
White-box robustness The white-box robustness of our
model is compared with the baseline model on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 under FGSM, BIM, PGD, and C&W [4] attacks.
The testing attack parameters for FGSM, PGD, and BIM
attacks follow Tab.1. For C&W attacks, we use learning
rate 0.2 and 40 steps with a Lagrange multiplier of 1.0. The
results on robustness and clean accuracy are summarized
in Tab.2. The proposed model (Pr) achieves the best white-
box robustness under all attacks tested. In particular, the
proposed method improves white-box PGD robustness from
93.2% to 95.7% on MNIST under 40 steps, and from 49.7%
to 54.4% on CIFAR-10 under 7 PGD steps. Furthermore, ex-
periments on Restricted ImageNet shows that our model can
improve robustness (clean accuracy) from 92.75% (96.83%)
of Madry et al. to 93.85% (97.25%).
In addition, we test how robustness changes along with
the number of iterations (t) in PGD attacks. To do so, we in-
crease t from 0 to 20 while fixing the attack bound  and the
step size a, and compare the performance between Pr and
Br (Fig.4). The proposed model consistently out-performs
the baseline. It should also be noted that our model is compa-
rable to TRADES [28], although a more rigorous comparison
is needed (e.g., [28] uses ResNet-18 for CIFAR-10, while we
followed the model in [17]). Specifically, on CIFAR-10 with
Table 2. Robustness on MNIST and CIFAR-10 against white-box
attacks. “None”: clean test accuracy.
attack
MNIST None FGSM BIM PGD C&W
Bs 98.9 7.0 0.0 0.0 3.2
Ps(Ours) 99.3 5.7 0.8 0.5 20.8
Br 98.4 95.2 92.5 93.2 91.7
Pr(Ours) 99.2 96.9 95.0 95.7 96.0
CIFAR-10 None FGSM BIM PGD C&W
Bs 95.2 12.8 0.0 4.1 0.0
Ps(Ours) 95.6 15.2 0.0 13.0 0.3
Br 87.3 56.4 48.36 49.7 19.51
Pr(Ours) 87.9 59.4 52.9 54.4 22.89
20-step PGD and  = 8/255, TRADES achieves robustness
(clean accuracy) of 56.6% (84.9%) for 1/λ = 6 and 49.1%
(88.6%) for 1/λ = 1. In comparison, our model achieves a
robustness (clean accuracy) of 50.3% (87.7%).
Figure 4. Model robustness for a range of number of PGD steps.
Furthermore, we compare the white-box robustness under
PGD attacks beyond the attack bounds  used during adver-
sarial training. For MNIST, we test  ∈ [0, 1] where  = 1
represents the maximal l∞ attack strength. For CIFAR-
10, we test  ∈ [0, 35/255]. The comparisons are shown
in Fig. 5. Still, the proposed method exhibits consistently
higher robustness than the baseline under all attack bounds.
Figure 5. Model robustness for a range of attack bounds. The attack
bounds used for training are marked as black vertical lines.
Different Transformations We now test how the pro-
posed method performs using different input transformations.
First we study the influence of the number of input crops and
the cropping size on model robustness using MNIST: For the
former, we fix the cropping size to 20 and vary the number
of crops from 1 to 64. For the latter, we fix the number of
crops to 9 and vary the cropping size from 12 to 24. The
robustness of these models under white-box PGD attacks
with settings in Tab.1 are summarized in Tab. 3. It can be
seen that increasing the number of crops helps to improve
both clean and adversarial accuracy, with diminishing effect.
On the other hand, a sweet spot exists for the cropping size:
Larger cropping sizes tend to improve clean test accuracy,
yet inevitably lead to reduced robustness.
Table 3. Parametric study on the number of crops and the cropping
size used in the proposed model
cropping size 12 16 20 24 28
clean testing 11.3 98.6 99.2 99.1 98.4
PGD white-box 11.1 94.2 95.7 94.9 93.2
# of crops 1 4 9 36 64
clean testing 98.3 99.0 99.2 99.2 99.2
PGD white-box 92.1 95.1 95.7 96.1 96.1
Another experiment is performed on testing the effect of
using input rotation and zooming as transformations. For ro-
tation, we use the built-in rotation function from TensorFlow
and equal rotation intervals up to 4 degrees. For zooming,
we first apply cropping and then re-scale the image back
to the original size through bi-linear interpolation. Tab.4
shows mixed results. On MNIST, rotation yields more ro-
bust models while zooming does not; on CIFAR-10, model
robustness improves with mild rotation angles (maximum 4
degrees); yet larger angles, e.g. maximum 30 degrees, show
limited effects (not listed here). The reason could be that
larger rotations introduces more features that require a larger
network capacity to learn.
Table 4. Robustness (accuracy) of models trained on transformation-
invariant attacks for MNIST and CIFAR-10. The reference on
baseline model Br is also listed on the top of the table.
MNIST, Br: 93.2 (98.4)
|T | 1 4 9
cropping 92.1 (98.3) 95.1 (99.0) 95.7 (99.2)
rotation 93.3 (98.7) 95.5 (99.1) 96.1(99.3)
zooming 90.7 (99.2) 91.5 (98.5) 93.6 (99.2)
CIFAR-10, Br: 47.3 (87.3)
|T | 1 4 8
cropping 45.1 (80.5) 53.3 (83.1) 54.4 (87.9)
rotation 46.5 (78.6) 54.4 (86.8) 53.8 (87.8)
Lastly, we note that combining different transformations
can lead to additional improvement in robustness. Specifi-
cally, we tested the white-box PGD robustness of the com-
bination of two models on MNIST, trained separately with
cropping (cropping size of 20, 9 crops) and rotation (4 ori-
entations, max angle of 4 degrees) as the input transforma-
tions. The combined model outputs aggregated decisions
from these two models, and reaches a white-box robustness
of 97.2%, while the two individual models have individual
robustness of 95.7% (cropping) and 95.5% (rotation).
3.2. Gradient Obfuscation
We have shown that our model achieves high white-
box robustness. However, as discussed in [2], models
with gradient obfuscation (shattering, masking, and explo-
sion/vanishing) can have close to zero robustness. We first
note that the proposed model does not create shattering since
it has no randomness; and does not create gradient explo-
sion or vanishing since it does not contain long recurrence.
In the following, we investigate whether gradient masking
exists in our model. We use standard tools to this end, in-
cluding black-box attacks, non-gradient based attacks, and
visualization of the loss landscape.
Black-box robustness We perform PGD attacks on four
source models: vanilla (Bs) and robust (Br) versions of
Baseline model, and those (Ps and Pr) of the proposed.
We again use the attack settings listed in Tab.1 to generate
adversarial samples on the source model. Test results on
the target model are summarized in Tab.5, where rows and
columns correspond to different tests and source models,
respectively. Diagonal elements in the table corresponds
to the white-box robustness. The proposed model achieves
good robustness in these tasks. Since gradient masking often
results in higher robustness for white-box rather than black-
box attacks, this result suggests that the proposed model
does not relay on gradient masking.
Table 5. Robustness on MNIST/ CIFAR-10 against black-box PGD
attacks. Columns are the source model to obtain adversaries, rows
are different target models to be attacked. Diagonal terms in the
table are white box robustness.
Bs Ps Br Pr
Bs 0.0/0.0 8.8/0.2 85.6/79.8 94.8/68.0
Ps 39.3/ 0.2 0.6/ 0.0 63.6/ 81.1 89.5/ 69.7
Br 93.2/ 96.7 96.5/ 86.1 93.2/ 47.4 95.5/ 66.9
Pr 97.9/ 86.2 97.4/ 86.3 98.2/ 69.5 95.7/ 54.4
None-gradient based attacks We tested the performance
of Br and Pr under white-box SPSA attacks [25]. As shown
in Fig.6, the proposed method consistently out-performs the
baseline under different SPSA max. iteration numbers and
batch sizes. Since SPSA uses estimated gradient instead of
direct differentiation, it is less likely to be affected by gradi-
ent masking. Our model is able to obtain higher robustness
on SPSA, which again indicates that the proposed model
does not rely on gradient masking.
Loss landscape Lastly, we visualize the loss landscapes
of Pr around random test data points. As shown in Fig. 7,
the landscapes for Pr trained on both MNIST and CIFAR-10
are smooth. This further confirms that the proposed model
does not rely on gradient masking.
Figure 6. Network robustness under SPSA attack.
Figure 7. Loss landscapes around random test samples on MNIST
(top row) and CIFAR-10 (bottom row). 1 is the adversarial gradient
direction and 2 is a random direction orthogonal to 1.
3.3. Performance Analysis
Effect of transformation-invariant attacks To better un-
derstand the effect of transformation ensemble on model
robustness, an ablation study is conducted.
No ensemble in the training phase: We remove the influ-
ence of ensemble on the generation of adversaries during
training phase, in which case the training becomes stan-
dard adversarial training with training data replaced by their
cropped copies. For example, when using nine cropping
windows, it leads to a 9-fold data augmentation. During
adversarial training, this experiment setting results in ad-
versaries that target individual transformations, and are not
necessarily transformation invariant. In the test phase, we
perform the same ensemble operation as in Eq. (2). On
MNIST, these settings lead to a model robustness of 93.4%
and clean test accuracy of 98.7%, which is comparable to
the baseline model and worse than the proposed. This ex-
periment reveals the critical role of transformation-invariant
attacks in improving robustness from standard adversarial
training. We conjecture that when the model is attacked by
adversaries for individual transformations, these adversaries
may lead to contradictory gradient directions for model re-
finement, i.e., refining the model with respect to attacks for
one particular transformation may not help (or even worsen)
the robustness under other transformations.
No ensemble in the test phase: Here we train the model
as proposed, and test the white-box robustness of each indi-
vidual network copy in the ensemble. The copies are only
different in their input transformation layers. As shown in
Fig.8, the robustness of individual copies are slightly lower
than the robustness of the ensemble (95.7% and 54.4%), sug-
gesting that the ensemble also contributes to improvement
in robustness.
Figure 8. White-box robustness of individual network copies within
the ensemble under PGD attacks. Locations in the grid correspond
to cropping locations.
Learning efficiency Lastly, we test how Br and Pr per-
forms when they are trained with different amount of training
data. PGD attacks with parameters from Tab.1 are applied
in both training and testing. Results are shown in Tab.6. It is
obvious that the proposed model consistently requires less
training data for the same robustness or accuracy levels.
Table 6. Comparison on learning efficiency. A: clean test accuracy,
R: white-box robustness under PGD attacks
|D|
MNIST 0.3k 1k 3k 10k 30k 60k
A(Br) 91.7 96.6 96.5 97.8 98.5 98.4
A(Pr) 93.4 96.3 97.6 98.5 98.8 99.2
R(Br) 35.0 73.6 80.5 86.7 88.0 93.2
R(Pr) 68.2 82.6 89.0 93.7 95.6 95.7
CIFAR-10 0.3k 1k 3k 10k 30k 60k
A(Br) 43.1 52.2 62.5 73.2 80.0 87.3
A(Pr) 43.3 55.0 67.4 72.1 80.2 87.9
R(Br) 10 12.8 21.4 33.1 45.3 47.4
R(Pr) 12.7 17.6 27.2 37.2 47.8 54.5
4. Conclusion
In this paper we investigated a learning architecture that
incorporates input transformations into adversarial training,
and showed that the resultant model (1) improves empir-
ical robustness over standard adversarial training; (2) is
free of gradient obfuscation; and (3) is more data efficient.
Importantly, we also showed that while constraining the
model to be transformation-invariant (through data augmen-
tation) does not help improve model robustness, incorpo-
rating transformation-invariant attacks in training plays a
critical role in achieving this goal.
References
[1] N. Akhtar and A. Mian. Threat of adversarial attacks on
deep learning in computer vision: A survey. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1801.00553, 2018. 1
[2] A. Athalye, N. Carlini, and D. Wagner. Obfuscated gradients
give a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to
adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.00420, 2018.
1, 2, 4
[3] A. Athalye and I. Sutskever. Synthesizing robust adversarial
examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.07397, 2017. 1, 2
[4] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness
of neural networks. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (SP), pages 39–57. IEEE, 2017. 2, 3
[5] P.-Y. Chen, Y. Sharma, H. Zhang, J. Yi, and C.-J. Hsieh. Ead:
elastic-net attacks to deep neural networks via adversarial
examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.04114, 2017. 2
[6] Y. Dong, T. Pang, H. Su, and J. Zhu. Evading defenses
to transferable adversarial examples by translation-invariant
attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.02884, 2019. 1
[7] I. Evtimov, K. Eykholt, E. Fernandes, T. Kohno, B. Li,
A. Prakash, A. Rahmati, and D. Song. Robust physical-
world attacks on machine learning models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.08945, 2017. 1
[8] K. Eykholt, I. Evtimov, E. Fernandes, B. Li, A. Rahmati,
C. Xiao, A. Prakash, T. Kohno, and D. Song. Robust physical-
world attacks on deep learning visual classification. In Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, pages 1625–1634, 2018. 1
[9] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and
Harnessing Adversarial Examples. pages 1–11, 2014. 1
[10] C. Guo, M. Rana, M. Cisse, and L. van der Maaten. Coun-
tering adversarial images using input transformations. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1711.00117, 2017. 1
[11] J. Hendrik Metzen, M. Chaithanya Kumar, T. Brox, and V. Fis-
cher. Universal adversarial perturbations against semantic
image segmentation. In Proceedings of the IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Computer Vision, pages 2755–2764,
2017. 1
[12] S. Huang, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, Y. Duan, and P. Abbeel.
Adversarial Attacks on Neural Network Policies. 2017. 1
[13] J. Kos and D. Song. Delving into adversarial attacks on deep
policies. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.06452, 2017. 1
[14] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial exam-
ples in the physical world. Arxiv, (c):1–15, 2016. 1
[15] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial exam-
ples in the physical world. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533,
2016. 1, 2
[16] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial ma-
chine learning at scale. arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.01236,
2016. 2
[17] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and A. Vladu.
Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083, 2017. 1, 2, 3
[18] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard. Deepfool:
a simple and accurate method to fool deep neural networks.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition, pages 2574–2582, 2016. 1, 2
[19] A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune. Deep neural networks
are easily fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecog-
nizable images. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages 427–436,
2015. 1
[20] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami. Practical black-box attacks against machine
learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pages 506–519.
ACM, 2017. 1
[21] M. Sharif, S. Bhagavatula, L. Bauer, and M. K. Reiter. Ac-
cessorize to a crime: Real and stealthy attacks on state-of-
the-art face recognition. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Se-
curity, pages 1528–1540. ACM, 2016. 1
[22] J. Su, D. Vasconcellos Vargas, and S. Kouichi. One pixel
attack for fooling deep neural networks. ArXiv e-prints, Oct.
2017. 2
[23] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan,
I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013. 1, 2
[24] F. Trame`r, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh,
and P. McDaniel. Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and
defenses. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.07204, 2017. 1
[25] J. Uesato, B. O’Donoghue, A. v. d. Oord, and P. Kohli. Adver-
sarial risk and the dangers of evaluating against weak attacks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.05666, 2018. 4
[26] S. Ullman, L. Assif, E. Fetaya, and D. Harari. Atoms of
recognition in human and computer vision. 113(10), 2016. 2
[27] C. Xie, J. Wang, Z. Zhang, Y. Zhou, L. Xie, and A. Yuille.
Adversarial examples for semantic segmentation and object
detection. In International Conference on Computer Vision.
IEEE, 2017. 1
[28] H. Zhang, Y. Yu, J. Jiao, E. P. Xing, L. E. Ghaoui, and M. I.
Jordan. Theoretically principled trade-off between robustness
and accuracy. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.08573, 2019. 1, 2, 3
